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OPENING STATEMENT OF ISSUES IN REPLY BRIEF 
This Brief is in reply to the Appellee's Brief, sometimes 
hereinafter called Ebert's Brief, and is limited basically in its 
response to the three points of argument advanced by Ebert in his 
brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE ALLEGED 
IMPROPER ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE. 
The parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of law. 
It is not a rule of evidence. The cases which hold evidence 
violative of the parol evidence rule must be excluded, even 
though admitted without objection, and these cases emphasize the 
substantiveness of the rule. Because it is a rule of substantive 
law, the time at which the rule may be invoked differs markedly 
from the time at which a rule of evidence must be invoked. In 
fact, the time element of invoking the rule is the hallmark and 
is the only difference between the two rules. If there is no 
time difference in which the rules must be invoked, then it is 
difficult to perceive that any effect has been given to the words 
that the parol evidence rule is a "substantive rule of law". 
The Utah cases provided in Ebert's Brief appear to set 
the same time standard for invoking the two rules, requiring that 
each must be invoked timely during trial. But, it does not 
appear from the cases that the substantiveness of the parol 
evidence rule has ever been addressed by the Court. Ebert's 
brief does not meet the issue raised by the beneficiaries that 
the parol evidence rule is one of substantive law. The beneficiaries 
lay before the Court the question of whether the substantiveness 
of the rule enlarges the time in which it may be invoked, and 
requires that evidence violative of the parol evidence rule, even 
though admitted without objection, must be excluded when the rule 
is invoked in a post-trial motion, at least under the facts of this 
case. The cases cited by the beneficiaries are from those juris-
dictions which have acknowledged the substantiveness of the rule 
and given affect to it with the result being it is not necessary 
to object to the admission of the evidence which is in violation 
of the parol evidence rule during the trial. The objection may 
be first raised following the trial and some cases permit the 
raising of the objection even at a later date. The beneficiaries 
invoked the parol evidence rule following trial in a connection 
with several motions including the motion for a new trial. 
The beneficiaries have no argument with Rule 103 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Those rules are just what the title 
states—rules of evidence. Parol evidence rule is not the rule 
of evidence but a substantive rule of law, and therefore 
distinguishable from and not subject to the Rules of Evidence. 
The appellees cite the case of Edmonds v. Galey, 458 
P.2d 650 (Wyo. 1969) in which the Court said: 
[T]he parol evidence rule, like most things, has its 
exceptions. It does not apply where the writing is 
collateral to the issue involved, and the action is 
not based on such writing. To state it another way, 
the parol evidence rule applies only where the 
enforcement of an obligation created by the writing 
is substantially the cause of action. . . . 
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Justheim's Codicil is the "writing" and is substantially the cause 
of action in this case. It is the Codicil which Respondent 
Ebert's attorney states "would be submitted to the Probate Court 
for final determination"; and further informed Ebert "that the 
Codicil was written evidence of Clarence's intent to give Ray the 
stock" (Ebert's brief, Page 12). It was the Codicil upon which 
Ebert relied to transfer Justheim's stock as his letter to the 
transfer agent, in which Ebert enclosed a copy of the Codicil, 
states "the Codicil bequeathed to me all of Clarence I. Justheim's 
interest in Wyoming Petroleum Corp." (emphasis added, Exhibit I, 
Beneficiaries' Brief). In May 1984, Ebert wrote to the accountant, 
John Dinero, who was working on the Inventory for the Estate: 
"In May, 1981, C.I.J, signed a Codicil to his 
Will giving me all of his holdings in Wyo. Pet. 
He also handed me certificates (120,431 shares) 
stating "don't let Bud (J. H. Morgan, Jr.) know 
anything about these" (Exhibit 1, Appellant's 
Brief) (emphasis added). 
Ebert relied on the Codicil as a valid testamentary instrument in 
which he was "bequeathed" all of Justheim's stock in Wyoming 
Petroleum, in his dealings with John Morgan resulting in Ebert's 
control and becoming President of Wyoming Petroleum three months 
after Justheim's death. Trial Exhibits A, B, C and D which are 
subject matter of POINT III hereof and which are letters of Morgan 
to Ebert and show the assertion by Ebert .of the validity of the 
Codicil and his reliance thereon as well as the acceptance of 
that representation by Morgan. 
Without the Codicil, Ebert's claim to the stock is 
reduced to a naked oral claim or statement that the stock is his 
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by virtue of two inter vivos gifts from the deceased. Ebert 
needs and must have the Codicil in order to support his claim, 
particularly as he is the Trustee for the beneficiaries and 
Executor of the estate, and his claim as an individual is 
diametrically opposed to the interests of the estate and the 
beneficiaries of the Trust. The Codicil is the very heart of 
Ebert1s position as well as the basis of the claims of the 
beneficiaries. This is a proper case in which to give effect to 
the substantiveness of the parol evidence rule and apply it to 
the evidence of this case particularly as a result of Ebertfs 
close and unique relationship with Justheim, combined with his 
duty and loyalty as Trustee and Executor. Pepper v. Zions First 
National Bank, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 9 (Utah 1990) imposed upon 
Ebert the highest duty of care and loyalty: 
Executors and trustees are charged as 
fiduciaries with one of the highest duties 
of care and loyalty known in the law. . . • 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BASED ON ESTOPPEL 
All of the cases cited by Ebert are cases in which the 
parties are alive and before the Court, but the main party and actor 
involved in this case, Clarence Justheim, is deceased and on that 
basis alone, those cases are distinguishable from the present case. 
As noted in Ebert's brief, he had a long relationship with Justheim. 
However, it wasn't until Justheim was elderly and became incapaci-
tated as a result of an automobile accident that the uniqueness 
of the relationship ripened into an unusual one where Ebert was 
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almost his sole contact with the outside world as stated in 
Appellant's Brief: 
. . .For some five years, Ray spent six days a week, 
twenty minutes to five hours a day helping Clarence 
and Chickie. Ray visited Clarence, typed his 
personal correspondence, delivered his personal 
and corporate mail for him, assisted him in his 
personal affairs, shopped for him, helped him care 
for his invalid wife, and generally provided him 
the kind of comfort and companionship a confined 
person craves. . . . (Appellant's Brief, Page 7) 
(reference to transcript omitted) 
Further, as noted, Justheim amended his Trust on five occasions, 
the last being January 1981, two months prior to preparation of 
the Codicil. In the last Amendment, Justheim added Ebert as a 
.005% residuary beneficiary of the trust. Amendments were made 
with the assistance of an attorney. There are frequent contacts 
with Justheim's attorney. Obviously, there was availability of 
an attorney to assist in the estate planning at every stage. The 
Will and the Amendments to the Trust are evidence of the particu-
larity and thoroughness with which Justheim acted in matters of 
his estate. Ebert, as Trustee, had signed the Trust and the 
Amendments thereto and was aware of Justheim's estate planning. 
Notwithstanding Ebert's knowledge of the foregoing, his duty and 
loyalty to the beneficiaries as Trustee, his appointment as 
Executor of the estate, he prepared a Codicil which conflicted 
with his claim of inter vivos gifts asserted after the death of 
Justheim. He prepared a Codicil in which Ebert has Justheim1s say 
that Justheim owns 50% of the stock of Wyoming Petroleum, but if 
the 120,000 shares of the first gift are taken into account, 
Justheim owned less than 5% of the stock at the time Ebert prepared 
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the Codicil. Ebert had the control and power to disclose the 
ownership to be 5% and not 50% as to the amount of stock ownership 
by Justheim. He drafted and typed the Codicil. He authored or 
co-authored and created the Codicil. He, as any individual in 
society, owed the duty not to knowingly misrepresent a fact and 
certainly not to misrepresent the fact when the fact is designed 
to come to life or be published only when the other co-author is 
deceased. Ebert had an active hand in the misrepresentation set 
forth in the Codicil. Even if it be assumed that Ebert1s role is 
only one of silence, the Pepper case (P. 7) holds the silence as 
equivalent to fraudulent misrepresentation when there is a duty 
to speak. Ebert had such a duty to speak. He should have told 
or reminded Justheim something to the effect "you just recently 
made me a beneficiary of your Trust and the Wyoming stock is a 
substantial asset of your estate and I suggest we get your attorney 
to draw up some papers so that this matter can be handled by him 
as I am the Trustee and I do not want to have to explain to the 
beneficiaries. I would prefer the attorney do that." 
Ebert chose silence and that silence should be continued by the 
application of estoppel. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING EXHIBIT A, B, C AND D 
(EBERT'S BRIEF E, F, G AND H) 
Exhibits A, B, C and D flush out the relationship 
between the parties and give background as to how Justheim ran 
his affairs. They explain why Justheim said: "...Be damn sure 
to don't let Bud" Morgan know about the Wyoming stock, and why 
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Ebert never responded to the letters. Exhibits 1 and 3, 
Beneficiaries Brief. As already noted, they show the representa-
tion and reliance of Ebert on the Codicil. Exhibit A (Exhibit E 
of Ebert's brief) dated October 10, 1983, three months after 
Justheim's death, discloses that "you have indicated to me that 
Clarence, by his Will, had given you all of his stock in Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation. You mentioned that this was contained in 
one of the Amendments or Codicil to Clarence's Will." (emphasis 
added) Although Morgan is not pleased with the estimentary 
disposition, he accepts the representation without qualification 
as Morgan states further "you are obviously in control of Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation." 
Exhibit B shows the receipt by Morgan of a copy of the 
Will but no Codicil is furnished. It points out that the Will 
does not deal with the stock and reiterates that the Codicil is 
the basis of Ebert's claim to the stock. It throws light on how 
the control stock was obtained in a few short sentences and shows 
how the Will and the Trust operate. It does, particularly in 
retrospect, attack the credibility of Ebert in his statements. 
Exhibit C, dated December 4, 1983, does cover some of 
the same territory and points out that the change in the Will 
deprives beneficiaries of the stock. More importantly, Morgan is 
still not informed at this time of the claim of gifts and has not 
been furnished a copy of the Codicil. Although Ebert is not 
under duty to furnish Morgan with a copy, Ebert's claim of having 
received the stock under the Codicil had had great impact on 
their relationship and the management of Wyoming Petroleum and 
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vividly demonstrates the silence and unwillingness of Ebert to 
disclose the circumstances surrounding the stock. 
Exhibit D, dated January 21, 1983, acknowledges receipt 
of a copy of the Codicil and discloses the defectiveness of it 
and then goes on to ask a series of questions which anyone knowing 
the thoroughness of Justheim would raise and want answers to 
including the beneficiaries. 
These letters further show the strength and the assurance 
with which Ebert informed and convinced Morgan that he received 
the stock by virtue of the Codicil. It is demonstrative of an 
attitude and course of conduct which again affects his credibility 
and shows the relationship of the parties. They bear on the 
issues of loyalty to the beneficiaries and the credibility of 
Ebert and impeachment of Ebert. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court did 
commit error and the beneficiaries should be awarded a new trial 
and such other relief as the Court may deem proper. 
Dated this 14th day of January, 1991. 
BELL & BELL by 
^ c 
Bell 
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